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Abstract 
We extend the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) agency cost model of business cycles by 
including time varying uncertainty in the technology shocks that affect capital production. We 
first demonstrate that standard linearization methods can be used to solve the model yet 
second moment effects still influence equilibrium characteristics. The effects of the 
persistence of uncertainty are then analyzed. Our primary findings fall into three broad 
categories. First, it is demonstrated that uncertainty affects the level of the steady-state of 
the economy so that welfare analyses of uncertainty that focus entirely on the variability of 
output (consumption) will understate the true costs of uncertainty. A second key result is that 
time varying uncertainty results in countercyclical bankruptcy rates – a finding which is 
consistent with the data and opposite the result in Carlstrom and Fuerst. Third, we show that 
persistence of uncertainty affects both quantitatively and qualitatively the behavior of the 
economy. 
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1 Introduction
Business cycle research has long associated risk with cyclical movements in the economy.
It is therefore somewhat surprising that modern macroeconomics has, until quite recently,
ignored the interaction between uncertainty and cyclical dynamics. This lack of study
did not, however, reflect an inherent lack of interest, but was instead driven by primarily
technological constraints: the typical solution method used in solving calibrated business
cycle models imposes certainty equivalence so that the influence of uncertainty (i.e. second
moment eﬀects) are ruled out by construction.
One of the first models in which the variance of shocks played a prominent role was that
developed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000). While this analysis provided important insights
into the eﬀects of uncertainty (identified with the variance of money growth and productivity
shocks), the setting abstracted from capital accumulation so that the impact of risk on
investment could not be studied. Only very recently, have solution methods for quantitative
macroeconomic models (i.e. models in which the parameters can be calibrated to key features
of the economy) been developed that do not impose certainty equivalence. In particular,
Collard and Juillard (forthcoming), Sims (2001) and Grohe-Schmitt and Uribe (2001) present
diﬀerent solution techniques in which the second moments influence equilibrium dynamics.
The analysis presented here continues the emphasis on second moments but departs
from previous work by conducting the analysis within a setting in which information and
uncertainty play prominent roles in equilibrium characteristics. Specifically, we use the
business cycle model developed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). This model is particularly
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attractive for our purposes since it incorporates a lending channel (for investment) that is
characterized by asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. In addition, this
model is a variant of a typical real business cycle model so that key parameters can be
calibrated to the data. Within this setting, we model time varying uncertainty as a mean
preserving spread in the distribution of the technology shocks aﬀecting capital production
and explore how changes in uncertainty aﬀect equilibrium characteristics.
We first demonstrate that linearization solution methods can be employed yet this does
not eliminate the eﬀects of second moments. That is, in solving for the linear equilibrium
policy functions, the vector of state variables includes the variance of technology shocks
buﬀeting the capital production sector. We then examine how the persistence of a change
in the variance influences equilibrium characteristics. One of the primary findings is that
time varying uncertainty produces countercyclical bankruptcy rates. In contrast, Carlstrom
and Fuerst’s (1997) analysis of aggregate technology shocks produced the counterfactual
prediction of procyclical bankruptcy rates. Hence, the analysis presented here demonstrates
that second moment eﬀects, not surprisingly, expand the set of equilibrium characteristics;
moreover, in some instances, first and second moment eﬀects move in opposite directions.
This may have important consequences for understanding historical business cycles. That
is, historical business cycles can be diﬀerentiated by whether the shocks are predominantly to
aggregate supply or aggregate demand. Our analysis suggests that another useful distinction
may be the role of information; namely, is it the first or second moments of the shocks hitting
the economy that is dominant in influencing equilibrium characteristics.
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The next section presents the model while the following section discusses equilibrium
characteristics. The final section oﬀers some concluding comments.
2 Model
We employ the agency cost business cycle model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) to address
the financial intermediaries’ role in the propagation of productivity shocks and extend their
analysis by introducing time-varying uncertainty. Since, for the most part, the model is
identical to that in Carlstrom and Fuerst, the exposition of the model will be brief.
The model is a variant of a standard RBC model in which an additional production sector
is added. This sector produces capital using a technology which transforms investment
into capital. In a standard RBC framework, this conversion is always one-to-one; in the
Carlstrom and Fuerst framework, the production technology is subject to technology shocks.
(The aggregate production technology is also subject to technology shocks as is standard.)
This capital production sector is owned by entrepreneurs who finance their production via
loans from a risk neutral financial intermediation sector - this lending channel is characterized
by a loan contract with a fixed interest rate. (Both capital production and the loans are
intra-period.) If a capital producing firm realizes a low technology shock, it will declare
bankruptcy and the financial intermediary will take over production; this activity is subject
to monitoring costs. With this brief description, we now turn to an explicit characterization
of the economy.
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2.1 Households
The representative household is infinitely lived and has expected utility over consumption
ct and leisure 1− lt with functional form given by:
E0
∞P
t=0
βt [ln (ct) + ν (1− lt)] (1)
where E0 denotes the conditional expectation operator on time zero information, β ∈ (0, 1) ,
ν > 0, and lt is time t labor. The household supplies labor, lt, and rents its accumulated
capital stock, kt, to firms at the market clearing real wage, wt, and rental rate rt, respectively,
thus earning a total income of wtlt+ rtkt. The household then purchases consumption good
from firms at price of one (i.e. consumption is the numeraire), and purchases new capital,
it, at a price of qt. Consequently, his budget constraint is
wtlt + rtkt ≥ ct + qtit (2)
The law of motion for households’ capital stock is standard:
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + it (3)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate on capital.
The necessary conditions associated with the maximization problem include the standard
labor-leisure condition and the intertemporal eﬃciency condition associated with investment.
Given the functional form for preferences, these are:
νct = wt (4)
4
qt
ct
= βEt
·
qt+1 (1− δ) + rt+1
ct+1
¸
(5)
2.2 Firms
The economy’s output of the consumption good is produced by firms using Cobb-Douglas
technology1
Yt = θtKαKt HαHt (Het )
αHe (6)
where Yt represents the aggregate output, θt denotes the aggregate technology shock, Kt
denotes the aggregate capital stock, Ht denotes the aggregate household labor supply, Het
denotes the aggregate supply of entrepreneurial labor, and αK + αH + αHe = 1.2
The profit maximizing representative firm’s first order conditions are given by the fac-
tor market’s condition that wage and rental rates are equal to their respective marginal
productivities:
wt = θtαH
Yt
Ht
(7)
rt = θtαK
Yt
Kt
(8)
wet = θtαHe
Yt
Het
(9)
where wet denotes the wage rate for entrepreneurial labor.
1 Note that we denote aggregate variables with upper case while lower case represents per-capita values.
Prices are also lower case.
2 As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, we assume that the entrepreneur’s labor share is small, in particular,
αHe = 0.0001. The inclusion of entrepreneurs’ labor into the aggregate production function serves as a
technical device so that entrepreneurs’ net worth is always positive, even when insolvent.
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2.3 Entrepreneurs
A risk neutral representative entrepreneur’s course of action is as follows. To finance his
project at period t, he borrows resources from the Capital Mutual Fund according to an
optimal financial contract. The entire borrowed resources, along with his total net worth at
period t, are then invested into his capital creation project. If the representative entrepreneur
is solvent after observing his own technology shock, he then makes his consumption decision;
otherwise, he declares bankruptcy and production is monitored (at a cost) by the Capital
Mutual Fund.
2.4 Optimal Financial Contract
The optimal financial contract between entrepreneur and the Capital Mutual Fund is de-
scribed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). But for expository purposes as well as to explain
our approach in addressing the second moment eﬀect on equilibrium conditions, we briefly
outline the model.
The entrepreneur has access to a stochastic technology that transforms it units of con-
sumption into ωtit units of capital. Unlike Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), who let the tech-
nology shock ωt to be i.i.d. with a c.d.f. of Φ (ω) and a p.d.f. of φ (ω) that has a mean of
one with a constant standard deviation, we let the standard deviation vary over time. More
specifically, we assume that the standard deviation of the capital production technology
shock is governed by the following AR(1) process
σω,t = σ¯1−ζω σ
ζ
ω,t−1µt (10)
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where ζ ∈ (0, 1) and µt ∼ i.i.dwith a mean of unity. The unconditional mean of the standard
deviation is given by σ¯ω. The realization of ωt is privately observed by entrepreneur — banks
can observe the realization at a cost of µit units of consumption.
The entrepreneur enters period t with one unit of labor endowment and zt units of capital.
Labor is supplied inelastically while capital is rented to firms, hence income in the period is
wt + rtzt. This income along with remaining capital determines net worth (denominated in
units of consumption) at time t:
nt = wt + zt (rt + qt (1− δ)) (11)
With a positive net worth, the entrepreneur borrows (it − nt) consumption goods and
agrees to pay back
¡
1 + rk
¢
(it − nt) capital goods to the lender, where rk is the interest rate
on loans. Thus, the entrepreneur defaults on the loan if his realization of output is less then
the re-payment, i.e.
ωt <
¡
1 + rk
¢
(it − nt)
it
≡ ω¯t (12)
The optimal borrowing contract is given by the pair (i, ω¯) that maximizes entrepreneur’s
return subject to the lender’s willingness to participate (all rents go to the entrepreneur)3 :
max
{i,ω¯}
qif (ω¯) subject to qig (ω¯) ≥ (i− n)
where
f (ω¯) =
·Z ∞
ω¯
ωφ (ω) dω − [1− Φ (ω¯)] ω¯
¸
3 For convenience, all time subscripts are ignored.
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which can be interpreted as the fraction of the expected net capital output received by the
entrepreneur4 ,
g (ω¯) =
·Z ω¯
0
ωφ (ω) dω + [1− Φ (ω¯)] ω¯ −Φ (ω¯)µ
¸
which represents the lender’s fraction of expected capital output, Φ (ω¯) is the bankruptcy
rate so that Φ (ω¯)µ denotes monitoring costs. Also note that f (ω¯)+g (ω¯) = 1−Φ (ω¯)µ : the
RHS is the average amount of capital that is produced — this is split between entrepreneurs
and lenders. Hence the presence of monitoring costs reduces net capital production.5
The necessary conditions for the optimal contract problem are
∂ (.)
∂ω¯ : qif
0 (ω¯) = −λig0 (ω¯)
⇒ λ = −f
0 (ω¯)
g0 (ω¯)
λ = f
0 (ω¯)
φ (ω¯)µ + f 0 (ω¯)
λ = 1− Φ (ω¯)
1− Φ (ω¯)− φ (ω¯)µ
where λ is the shadow price of capital,6 and
∂ (.)
∂i : qf (ω¯) = −λ [1− qg (ω¯)]
4 The deriviative of this function is f 0 (ω¯) = Φ (ω¯)− 1. Thus, as Φ (ω¯) ∈ [0, 1], we have f 0 (ω¯) ≤ 0. That
is, as the lower bound for the realization of the technology shock (or the cutoﬀ bankruptcy rate) increases,
the entrepreneur’s output share goes down.
5 This suggests that monitoring costs are akin to investment adjustment costs - in fact, Carlstrom and
Fuerst demonstrate that this is the case. The important diﬀerence between this model and a model with
adjustment costs is that entrepreneurs’ net worth is an endogenous state variable that aﬀects the dynamics
of the economy - this feature is not present in an adjustment cost model.
6 Note that in the absence of monitoring costs, λ = 1 - the shadow price just covers the cost of capital
production
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Solving for q using the first order conditions, we have
q =
·
(f (ω¯) + g (ω¯)) + φ (ω¯)µf (ω¯)
f 0 (ω¯)
¸−1
(13)
=
·
1− Φ (ω¯)µ + φ (ω¯)µf (ω¯)
f 0 (ω¯)
¸−1
≡ [1−D (ω¯)]−1
where D (ω¯) can be thought of as the total default costs.
Equation (13) defines an implicit function ω¯ (q) that is increasing in q, or the price of
capital that incorporates the expected bankruptcy costs. The price of capital, q, diﬀers
from unity due to the presence of the credit market friction. That is, to compensate for the
bankruptcy (monitoring) costs, there must be a premium on the price of capital. And this
premium is set by the amount of monitoring costs and the probability of bankruptcy. (Note
that f 0 (ω¯) = Φ (ω¯)− 1 < 0.)
Finally, the incentive compatibility constraint implies
i =
1
(1− qg (ω¯))n (14)
Equation (14) implies that investment is linear in net worth and defines a function that
represents the amount of consumption goods placed in to the capital technology: i (q, n).
The fact that the function is linear implies that the aggregate investment function is well
defined.
2.5 Entrepreneur’s Consumption Choice
To rule out self-financing by the entrepreneur (i.e. which would eliminate the presence of
agency costs), it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts the future at a faster rate than
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the household. Thus, is represented by entrepreneur maximizes following expected utility
function
E0
∞P
t=0
(βγ)t cet (15)
where cet denotes entrepreneur’s consumption at date t, and γ ∈ (0, 1) . This new parameter,
γ, will be chosen so that it oﬀsets the steady-state internal rate of return to entrepreneurs’
investment.
At the end of the period, the entrepreneur finances consumption out of the returns from
the investment project implying that the law of motion for the entrepreneur’s capital stock
is:
zt+1 = nt
½
f (ω¯t)
1− qtg (ω¯t)
¾
− c
e
t
qt
(16)
Note that the expected return to internal fund is qtf(ω¯t)it
nt
; that is, the net worth of size nt
is leveraged into a project of size it, entrepreneurs keep the share of the capital produced and
capital is priced at qt consumption goods. Since these are intra-period loans, the opportunity
cost is 1.7
Consequently, the representative entrepreneur maximizes his expected utility function in
equation (15) over consumption and capital subject to the law of motion for capital, equation
(16), and the definition of net worth given in equation (11). The resulting Euler equation is
as follows:
qt = βγEt
½
[qt+1 (1− δ) + rt+1]
·
qt+1f (ω¯t+1)
(1− qt+1g (ω¯t+1))
¸¾
7 As noted above, we require in steady-state 1 = γ qtf(ω¯t)(1−qtg(ω¯t)) .
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2.6 Financial Intermediaries
The Capital Mutual Funds (CMFs) act as financial intermediaries who earn no profit and
produce neither consumption nor capital goods. There is a clear role for the CMF in this
economy since, through pooling, all aggregate uncertainty of capital production can be elim-
inated. The CMF receives capital from three sources: entrepreneurs sell undepreciated
capital in advance of the loan, after the loan, the CMF receives the newly created capital
through loan repayment and through monitoring of insolvent firms, and, finally, those en-
trepreneur’s that are still solvent, sell some of their capital to the CMF to finance current
period consumption. This capital is then sold at the price of qt units of consumption to
households for their investment plans.
2.7 Equilibrium
There are four markets: labor markets for households and entrepreneurs, goods markets for
consumption and capital.
Ht = (1− η) lt (17)
where η denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy.
Het = η (18)
Ct + It = Yt (19)
where Ct = (1− η) ct + ηcet and It = ηit.
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It [1− Φ (ω¯)µ] (20)
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A competitive equilibrium is defined by the decision rules for {Kt+1, Zt+1,Ht,Het , qt, nt, it, ω¯t, ct, cet}
where these decision rules are stationary functions of {Kt, Zt, θt, σω,t} and satisfy the follow-
ing equations8
νct = θtαH
Yt
Ht
(21)
qt
ct
= βEt
·
1
ct+1
µ
qt+1 (1− δ) + θt+1αK
Yt+1
Kt+1
¶¸
(22)
qt =
·
1− Φ (ω¯t) µ+
φ (ω¯) µf (ω¯t)
f 0 (ω¯t)
¸−1
(23)
it =
1
(1− qtg (ω¯t))
nt (24)
qt = βγEt
½·
qt+1 (1− δ) + θt+1αK
Yt+1
Kt+1 t+1
¸·
qt+1f (ω¯t+1)
(1− qt+1g (ω¯t+1))
¸¾
(25)
nt = θtαHe
Yt
Het
+ zt
·
qt (1− δ) + θtαK
Yt
Kt
¸
(26)
Zt+1 = ηnt
½
f (ω¯t)
1− qtg (ω¯t)
¾
− η c
e
t
qt
(27)
θt+1 = θρt ξt+1 where ξt ∼ i.i.d. with E (ξt) = 1 (28)
σω,t+1 = σ¯1−ζω σ
ζ
ω,tµt+1 where µt ∼ i.i.d. with E (µt) = 1 (29)
3 Equilibrium Characteristics
3.1 Steady-state analysis
While our focus is primarily on the cyclical behavior of the economy, an examination of the
steady-state properties of the economy is useful for two reasons. First, by studying the
interaction between uncertainty (i.e. the variance of the technology shock aﬀecting the cap-
ital production sector) and the steady-state, the intuition for how time-varying uncertainty
8 A more thorough presentation of the equilibrium conditions are presented in the Appendix.
12
aﬀects the cyclical characteristics of the economy will be improved. Second, it is important
to point out that changes in the second moment of technology shocks aﬀect the level of
the economy - most notably consumption and output. That is, since the cyclical analysis
presented in the following section is characterized in terms of deviations from steady-state,
the impact of changes in uncertainty on the level of economic activity is lost.9
For this analysis, we use, to a large extent, the parameters employed in Carlstrom and
Fuerst’s (1997) analysis. Specifically, the following parameter values are used:
Table 1: Parameter Values
β α δ µ
0.99 0.36 0.02 0.25
Agents discount factor, the depreciation rate and capital’s share are fairly standard in
RBC analysis.10 The remaining parameter, µ, represents the monitoring costs associated
with bankruptcy. This value, as noted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) is relatively prudent
given estimates of bankruptcy costs (which range from 20% (Altman (1984) to 36% (Alderson
and Betker (1995) of firm assets).
The remaining parameters, (σ, γ), determine the steady-state bankruptcy rate (which
we denote as br and is expressed in percentage terms) and the risk premium (denoted rp)
9 This statement is in reference to Lucas’s analysis of the cost of business cycles (Lucas (1987) in which
the trend and cycle are treated as distinct. In contrast, our analysis demonstrates that the cyclical behavior
of the economy has implications for the level of the steady-state. If one were using an endogenous growth
model, cyclical behavior may well have implications for the trend.
10 The fraction of households in the economy, η, is purely a normalization and does not influence equilib-
rium steady-state. See Appendix 1 for details.
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associated with bank loans.11 (Also, recall that γ is calibrated so that the rate of return to
internal funds is equal to 1γ .) While Carlstrom and Fuerst found it useful to use the observed
bankruptcy rate to determine σ, for our analysis we treat σ and br as exogenous and examine
the steady state behavior of the economy under diﬀerent scenarios. In particular we consider
the following four economies:12
Table 2: Four Economies
Economy σ br (%) γ
Economy I
(C&F )
0.207 0.974 0.9474
Economy II 0.30 0.974 0.9538
Economy III 0.30 1.2 0.9458
Economy IV 0.35 1.8 0.9287
Hence Economy II departs from the Carlstrom and Fuerst economy by having greater
uncertainty in the technology shock but holds the bankruptcy rate at the same level used
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (note that this implies that the internal rate of return
³
1
γ
´
to en-
trepreneurs falls). Economy III then permits the bankruptcy rate to increase by roughly
a third. The final economy increases both the degree of technological uncertainty and the
steady-state bankruptcy rate. To examine the eﬀects of these changes, Table 3 reports the
behavior of several key variables; for all but two variables, these are presented as percentage
11 The equations defining the steady-state are presented in the Appendix. This derivation also demon-
strates that the parameter η (the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy) is strictly a normalization and
does not influence equilibrium characteristics.
12 In Table 2, the values of γ are reported strictly for comparison. That is, once the values of σ and br
are specified, the value of γ is determined endogenously.
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deviations from the values in the Carlstrom and Fuerst economy. The risk premium diﬀer-
ential is reported as an absolute change while the minimum technology shock defined in the
lending contract (i.e. ω¯) in the three modified economies is reported
Table 3: Steady-state behavior
(comparison to Carlstrom & Fuerst Economy)
variable Economy II Economy III Economy IV
c -0.19 -0.44 -1.18
k -0.51 -1.13 -3.05
rp 0.54 1.06 2.98
q 0.35 0.78 2.11
ω¯13 0.47 0.49 0.45
z 28.4 25.0 28.4
n 28.7 25.7 30.4
Note that increases in uncertainty reduce the steady-state level of consumption and
the aggregate capital stock monotonically. For the high variance, high bankruptcy rate
economy (Economy IV), the reduction in consumption is greater than 1% - a non-trivial
amount and similar in magnitude to welfare losses reported by Lucas for moderate inflations
(Lucas (2000)). Clearly, more research is needed to examine the welfare consequences of
uncertainty - in particular, one of the lessons of the equity premium puzzle literature is
that logarithmic preferences are not consistent with agents’ treatment of aggregate risk;
13 In the Carstrom and Fuerst economy, the minimum technology realization for solvency is: ω¯ = 0.60.
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introducing habit persistence or other preferences that more accurately represent agents’
risk tolerance would be a first step. We leave this to future research.
The risk premium associated with the lending contract as well as the price of capital
are also monotonically increasing in the variance and the bankruptcy rate. However, note
that this is not the case for the last three variables. In particular, the comparison between
Economies II and III shows that holding the variance of the technology shock constant but
increasing the steady-state bankruptcy rate results in a fall (again relative to Economy II)
in both the entrepreneurs’ capital stock (z) and net worth (n). This occurs despite the fact
that the price of capital is greater and reflects the impact that the greater bankruptcy rate
has on the level of lending in the economy.
We now examine the cyclical behavior of the economy with time-varying uncertainty in
the capital production sector.
3.2 Cyclical Behavior
As described in Section 2, eqs. (21)through (29) determine the equilibrium properties of
the economy. To analyze the cyclical properties of the economy, we linearize (i.e. take a
first-order Taylor series expansion) of these equations around the steady-state values. This
numerical approximation method is standard in quantitative macroeconomics. What is not
standard in this model is that the second moment of technology shocks hitting the capital
production sector will influence equilibrium behavior and, therefore, the equilibrium policy
rules. That is, linearizing the equilibrium conditions around the steady-state typically
imposes certainty equivalence so that variances do not matter. In this model, however, the
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variance of the technology shock can be treated as an additional state variable through its
role in determining lending activities and, in particular, the nature of the lending contract.
Linearizing the system of equilibrium conditions does not eliminate that role in this economy
and, hence, we think that this is an attractive feature of the model.
While the previous section analyzed the steady-state behavior of four diﬀerent economies,
in this section we employ the same parameters as in the Carlstrom and Fuerst model (Econ-
omy I in the previous section). We depart from Carlstrom and Fuerst by relaxing the i.i.d.
assumption for the capital sector technology shock. This is reflected in the law of motion
for the standard deviation of the technology shock which is given in eq. (29); for convenience
this is rewritten below:
σω,t+1 = σ¯1−ζω σ
ζ
ω,tµt+1
As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, the standard deviation of the technology shock ωt is, on
average, equal to 0.207. That is, we set σ¯ω = 0.207. We then examine two diﬀerent
economies characterized by the persistence in uncertainty, i.e. the parameter ζ. In the low
persistence economy, we set ζ = 0.05 while in the high persistence economy we set ζ = 0.95.
The behavior of these two economies is analyzed by examining the impulse response functions
of several key variables to a 1% innovation in σω. These are presented in Figures 1-3.
We first turn to aggregate output and household consumption and investment. With
greater uncertainty, the bankruptcy rate increases in the economy (this is verified in Figure
2), which implies that agency costs increase. The rate of return on investment for the econ-
omy therefore falls. Households, in response, reduce investment and increase consumption
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and leisure. The latter response causes output to fall. Note that the consumption and
leisure response is increasing in the degree of persistence. This is not the case, however, for
investment - this is due to the increase in the price of capital (see Figure 2) and reflects the
behavior of entrepreneurs. This behavior is understood after first examining the lending
channel.
The increase in uncertainty aﬀects, predictably, all three key variables in the lending
channel: the price of capital, the risk premium associated with loans and the bankruptcy
rate. As already mentioned, the bankruptcy rate increases and, in the high persistence
economy, this increased rate of bankruptcy lasts for several quarters. This result implies
that the bankruptcy rate is countercyclical in this economy; in contrast, in the analysis
by Carlstrom and Fuerst the bankruptcy rate was, counterfactually, procyclical. Their
focus was on the eﬀects of innovation to the aggregate technology shock and, because of
the assumed persistence in this shock, is driven by the change in the first moment of the
aggregate production shock. Our analysis demonstrates that second moment eﬀects may
play a significant role in these correlations over the business cycle. Further research, both
empirical and theoretical, in this area would be fruitful . Returning to the model, the
increased bankruptcy rate implies that price of capital is greater and this increase lasts
longer in the high persistence economy. The same is true for the risk premium on loans.
Figure 3 reports the consumption and net worth of entrepreneurs in the economies. In
contrast to all other variables, persistence has a dramatic qualitative eﬀect on entrepreneurs’
behavior. With low persistence, entrepreneur’s exploit the high price of capital to increase
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consumption: the lack persistence provides no incentive to increase investment. Since the
price of capital quickly returns to its steady-state values, the increased consumption erodes
entrepreneurs’ net worth. To restore net worth to its steady-state value, consumption falls
temporarily. The behavior in the high persistence economy is quite diﬀerent: the price
of capital is high and forecast to stay high so investment increases dramatically. Initially,
the investment is financed by lower consumption, but as entrepreneurs net worth increases
(due to greater capital and a higher price of capital) consumption also increases. This
endogenous response by entrepreneurs is why, in the high persistence economy, the initial
fall in aggregate investment is not as great in the high persistence economy.
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Figure 1:  Impulse Response Functions 
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Figure 2:  Impulse Response Functions 
Price of Capital, Risk Premium, Bankruptcy Rate 
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions 
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4 Conclusion
The eﬀect of uncertainty as characterized by second moment eﬀects has been largely ignored
in quantitative macroeconomics due to the numerical approximation methods typically em-
ployed during the computational exercise. The analysis presented here uses standard solu-
tion methods (i.e. linearizing around the steady-state) but exploits features of the Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) agency cost model of business cycles so that time varying uncertainty can
be analyzed. While development of more general solution methods that capture second
moments eﬀects is encouraged, we think that the intuitive nature of this model and its stan-
dard solution method make it an attractive environment to study the eﬀects of time-varying
uncertainty.
Our primary findings fall into three broad categories. First, we demonstrate that un-
certainty aﬀe cts the le ve l o f the ste ady-sta t e of t he e c ono my s o that wel f are ana ly se s of
uncertainty that focus entirely on the variability of output (or consumption) will understate
the true costs of uncertainty. Second, we demonstrate that time varying uncertainty results
in countercyclical bankruptcy rates - a finding which is consistent with the data and opposite
the re sult in C arl strom and Fu erst. Thi rd , we s how tha t p e rsi sten ce of unce rtai nty aﬀects
both quantitatively and qualitatively the behavior of the economy. Together, these results
make a strong case for more research into the eﬀects that uncertainty have on economic
behavior.
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5 Appendix: Steady-state conditions in the Carlstrom
and Fuerst Agency Cost Model
We first present the equilibrium conditions and express these in scaled (by the fraction of
entrepreneurs in the economy) terms. Then the equations are analyzed for steady-state
implications. As in the text, upper case variables denote aggregate wide while lower case
represent household variables. Preferences and technology are:
U (c˜, 1− l) = ln c˜+ ν (1− l)
Y = θKα [(1− η) l]1−α−φ ηφ
Where η denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy and θ is the technology
shock. Note that aggregate household labor is L = (1− η) l while entrepreneurs inelastically
supply one unit of labor. We assume that the share of entrepreneur’s labor is approximately
zero so that the production function is simply
Y = θKα [(1− η) l]1−α
This assumption implies that entrepreneurs receive no wage income (see eq. (9) in C&F.
There are nine equilibrium conditions:
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The resource constraint
(1− η) c˜t + ηcet + ηit = Yt = θtKαt [(1− η) lt]
1−α (30)
Let c = (1−η)c˜η and h =
(1−η)
η l, then eq(30) can be written as:
ct + c
e
t + it = θtkαt h1−αt (31)
Household’s intratemporal eﬃciency condition
c˜t =
(1− α)
ν K
α
t [(1− η) lt]
−α
Defining ν0 = η1−ην, this can be expressed as:
ν0ct = (1− α) kαt h−αt (32)
Law of motion of aggregate capital stock
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ηit [1− Φ (ω¯t) µ]
Dividing by η yields the scaled version:
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + it [1− Φ (ω¯t) µ] (33)
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Household’s intertemporal eﬃciency condition
qt
1
c˜t
= βEt
½
1
c˜t+1
£
qt+1 (1− δ) + θt+1αKα−1t+1 [(1− η) lt+1]
1−α¤¾
Dividing both sides by 1−ηη and scaling the inputs by η yields:
qt
1
ct
= βEt
½
1
ct+1
£
qt+1 (1− δ) + θt+1αkα−1t+1 h1−αt+1
¤¾
(34)
The conditions from the financial contract are already in scaled form:
Contract eﬃciency condition
qt =
1
1− Φ (ω¯t) µ+ φ (ω¯t) µ f (ω¯t)f 0(ω¯t)
(35)
Contract incentive compatibility constraint
it
nt
=
1
1− qtg (ω¯t)
(36)
Where nt is entrepreneur’s net worth.
Determination of net worth
ηnt = Zt
£
qt (1− δ) + θtKα−1t [(1− η) lt]
1−α¤
or, in scaled terms:
nt = zt
£
qt (1− δ) + θtkα−1t h1−αt
¤
(37)
Note that zt denotes (scaled) entrepreneur’s capital.
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Law of motion of entrepreneur’s capital
Zt+1 = ηnt
½
f (ω¯t)
1− qtg (ω¯t)
¾
− η c
e
t
qt
Or, dividing by η
zt+1 = nt
½
f (ω¯t)
1− qtg (ω¯t)
¾
− c
e
t
qt
(38)
Entrepreneur’s intertemporal eﬃciency condition
qt = γβEt
½£
qt+1 (1− δ) + θt+1αKα−1t+1 [(1− η) lt+1]
1−α¤µ qt+1f (ω¯t+1)
1− qt+1g (ω¯t+1)
¶¾
Or, in scaled terms:
qt = γβEt
½£
qt+1 (1− δ) + θt+1αkα−1t+1 h1−αt+1
¤µ qt+1f (ω¯t+1)
1− qt+1g (ω¯t+1)
¶¾
(39)
5.1 Definition of Steady-state
Steady-state is defined by time-invariant quantities:
ct = cˆ, c
e
t = cˆ
e, kt = kˆ, ω¯t = ωˆ, ht = hˆ, qt = qˆ, zt = zˆ, nt = nˆ, it = ıˆ
So there are nine unknowns. While we have nine equilibrium conditions, the two in-
tertemporal eﬃciency conditions become identical in steady-state since C&F impose the
condition that the internal rate of return to entrepreneur is oﬀset by their additional dis-
count factor:
γ
µ
qˆf (ωˆ)
1− qˆg (ωˆ)
¶
= 1 (40)
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This results in an indeterminacy - but there is a block recursiveness of the model due to
the calibration exercise. In particular, we demonstrate that the risk premium and bankruptcy
rate determine (ωˆ, σ) - these in turn determine the steady-state price of capital.
From eq.(34) we have:
qˆ =
αβ
1− β (1− δ) kˆ
α−1hˆ1−α =
αβ
1− β (1− δ)
yˆ
kˆ
(41)
From eq.(32) we have:
hˆ =
1− α
ν0
kˆαhˆ1−α
cˆ
=
1− α
ν0
yˆ
cˆ
(42)
From eq.(33) we have:
kˆ =
1− Φ (ωˆ)µ
δ ıˆ (43)
Note that these three equations are normally (i.e. in a typical RBC framework) used to
find steady-state
³
kˆ, hˆ, cˆ
´
- because qˆ = 1. Here since the price of capital is endogenous,
we have four unknowns.
From eq. (37) and eq. (34) we have
nˆ = zˆ
µ
qˆ (1− δ) + α yˆ
kˆ
¶
= zˆ
qˆ
β (44)
From eq. (38) and the restriction on the entrepreneur’s additional discount factor (eq.
(40)), we have
zˆ = nˆ
1
qˆγ −
cˆe
qˆ
(45)
Combining eqs. (44) and (45) yields:
cˆe
nˆ
=
1
γ − β (46)
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We have the two conditions from the financial contract
qˆ =
1
1− Φ (ωˆ)µ + φ (ωˆ)µ f (ωˆ)
f 0(ωˆ)
(47)
And
ıˆ =
1
1− qˆ (1− Φ (ωˆ) µ− f (ωˆ))nˆ (48)
Finally, we have the resource constraint:
cˆ+ cˆe + ıˆ = kˆαhˆ1−α (49)
The eight equations (41) , (42) , (43) , (44) , (45) , (47) , (48) , (49) are insuﬃcient to find
the nine unknowns. However, the risk premium, denoted as ζ, is defined by the following
qˆωˆ ıˆ
ıˆ− nˆ = ζ (50)
But we also know (from eq.(48) that
nˆ
ıˆ
= 1− qˆ (1− Φ (ωˆ)µ− f (ωˆ)) = 1− qˆg (ωˆ)
Rearranging eq.(50) yields:
qˆωˆ
ζ = 1−
nˆ
ıˆ
substituting from the previous expression yields
ωˆ = ζg (ωˆ) (51)
Let κ = bankruptcy rate — this observable also provides another condition on the distri-
bution. That is, we require:
Φ (ωˆ) = κ (52)
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The two equations eq.(51) and eq. (52) can be solved for the two unknowns - (ωˆ, σ).
By varying the bankruptcy rate and the risk premium, we can determine diﬀerent levels of
uncertainty (σ) and the cutoﬀ point (ωˆ).
Note that the price of capital in steady-state, is a function of (ωˆ, σ) as determined by
eq. (47). The other preference parameter, γ is then determined by eq. (40). Once
this is determined, the remaining unknowns:
³
cˆ, cˆe, hˆ, ıˆ, kˆ, zˆ, nˆ
´
are determined by eqs.
(41) , (42) , (43) , (44) , (46) , (48) , (49).
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